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THE FATE OF WOMEN'S COLLEGES: AN 
ANTI-SUBORDINATION ANALYSIS 
LISA DENISE GLADKE* 
Student life at an all-male military academy: 
[W]hat VMI taught about how to be a leader-haze, brutal-
ize, and dominate others, yell at and do not listen to others, 
drive out the different, beat self-esteem out of people, pre-
serve inane and dangerous rituals, resist change and cling to 
outmoded tradition ... [W] hat the VMI culture taught boys 
about being men-The virulent notion of hyper-masculinity 
implicit in VMI and The Citadel perpetuates a stereotyped 
notion that "real men" are aggressive, assaultive of and de-
meaning towards others, can only bond through shared physi-
cal adversity and not through emotional empathy or intellec-
tual respect, and should despise the "weak" and feminine 
within themselves and others.l 
Student life at a women's college: 
The absence of such negative elements in women's colleges, 
and the existence of a supportive environment in which 
women are taken seriously, may be responsible for the fact 
that graduates of these schools appear to be more successful 
in graduate training and jobs than female graduates of coedu-
cational colleges. In a recent survey of women's colleges, the 
presidents and faculties described their colleges' institutional 
mission as concerned with equity as well as with traditional 
liberal arts teaching goals. Their educational goals included 
providing a supportive atmosphere for women, encouraging 
women to take leadership roles, developing women's self-
confidence and self-respect, and fighting stereotypes.2 
* Symposium Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equa~ or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy 
ofPlessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089, 1116 (1996). 
2 Chai R. Feldblum et aI., Legal Challenges to AliFemale Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 171,179 (1986). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
These quotes illustrate the dramatic differences between the edu-
cational experiences at all-male academies and women's colleges. 
These experiences have been compared by commentators recently 
because of the 1996 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Vir-
ginia.3 The Court decided that the public all-male education offered 
by the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was not constitutional.4 While 
the decision did not rule on the fate of all-women colleges, commen-
tators have noted that a ruling against Virginia and VMI could have 
an adverse effect on all-women colleges, both public and private.5 
Although this is a legitimate concern, it is more likely that United States 
v. Virginia will be limited to the facts of that case.6 Because women's 
colleges have historically helped their students by eliminating harmful 
stereotypes, they stand in direct contrast to the all-male academies 
which discriminated against women. As a result, one could conclude 
that all-women education (public or private) is necessary and should 
not be threatened by the United States v. Virginia decision. 
This note examines the law regarding women's colleges and pro-
poses a different theory to view the issue of women's colleges. First, 
this note examines the 1996 Supreme Court decision of United States 
v. Virginia. Second, this note considers women's colleges under the 
current law, and the constitutionality of women's colleges in light of 
the possible effects of the ruling of United States v. Virginia. Finally, the 
issue of women's colleges is viewed through an anti-subordination lens. 
5116 s. Ct. 2264 (1996). 
4 See id. at 2269. 
5 See, e.g., Brief of Mary Baldwin College as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, 
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter Brief of 
Mary Baldwin]; Donald C. Alexander, How the Supreme Court Could KiU Single-Sex Education, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at A17; Daniel Seligman, As VMI Fares, So May Also the Wellesleys of 
the World, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 1996, at All. justice Scalia's dissent in United 
States v. Virginia likewise concluded all-female colleges would lose government funding, threat-
ening their existence, as a result of the majority'S decision. See 116 S. Ct. at 2306-07; see also 
Christopher H. Pyle, Women s Colleges: Is Segregation Uy Sex StiU Justifiabk After United States v. 
Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REv. 209, 210 (1997); jennifer R. Cowan, Note, Distinguishing Private 
Womens Colleges from the VMIDecision, 30 COLUM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137,161--63 (1997);jolee 
Land, Note, Not Dead Yet: The Future of Single-Sex Education After United States v. Virginia, 27 
STETSON L. REv. 297, 311-12 (1997). 
6 See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 5, at 138; Land, supra note 5, at 323. 
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II. THE VMI CASE 
A. Lower Court Decisions and the Supreme Court Opinion 
The first of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) cases was heard 
in 1991,7 The action was prompted by a complaint to the Attorney 
General from a female high school student who sought admission to 
VMI and was refused information from the school because she was 
female.s However, since the student was not a plaintiff in the case, the 
Justice Department alone initiated the suit against the state of Virginia 
and VMJ.9 The district court that first heard the case held that there 
was a substantial government interest in providing an all-male educa-
tion at VMI and allowed VMI to continue its all-male policy.lO The 
Justice Department appealed this decisionY The Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment and gave Virginia 
three options to remedy the situation: 1) become private, 2) admit 
women, or 3) create a parallel program for women. 12 The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. 13 
Virginia chose to create a parallel program for women and re-
turned to the district court for confirmation that its proposed remedial 
plan was acceptable.14 That court found that the all-female institute 
7 See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991). For a further discussion of 
the case as it wound its way through the courts in both the liability and remedial phases, see 
generally, R. Craig Wood & Luke Cornelius, Public Supported All-Male Military Colleges: The 
Supreme Court Rules in U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 118 ED. LAw REp. 819 (1997); Bennett 
L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex Edu-
cation with Equal Protection, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 637, 654-669 (1993); Jon Allyn Soderberg, The 
Virginia Military Institute and the Equal Protection Clause: A Factual and Legal Introduction, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 15 (1993); David M. Henry, VMI Faces Another Tough Battle in the Equal 
Protection War as u.s. Challenges School's Men-Only Policy, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 16, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 259760. 
8 See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 1415; see also Cowan, supra note 5, at 149-50. 
II See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1992). 
12 See id. at 900. The court also noted that Virginia could provide "other more creative options 
or combinations." Id. 
13 See generally United States v. Virginia, 508 U.S. 946 (1993). 
14 See generally United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994); Cowan, supra note 
5, at 150-52. Virginia created an alternative program, called the Virginia Women's Institute of 
Leadership (VWIL) , which was located on the campus of Mary Baldwin College. See Brief of Mary 
Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1. "The program is founded on the belief that women can and do 
provide significant leadership in the military and other traditionally male.<fominated fields, that 
career opportunity is not restricted by gender, and that single-sex education is for many women 
better than coeducation in achieving these goals." Id. at 2. 
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satisfied constitutional standards.15 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed Virginia's plan, finding that the two programs were 
comparable.16 A rehearing en banc was later denied by the Fourth 
Circuit,l7 
The Supreme Court decided United States v. Virginia on June 26, 
1996, over five years after the original district court's decision. IS The 
two issues that the Court had to ultimately decide were: 1) did Vir-
ginia's exclusion of women from VMI deny those women the equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) if 
VMI did violate the Equal Protection requirement, what should be 
the remedy?19 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, found that 
"[n]either the goal of producing citizen-soldiers nor VMI's implement-
ing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women .... Nevertheless, 
Virginia has elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and 
opportunities a VMI education affords. "20 With this ruling, VMI could 
no longer continue as a public all-male institution.21 
The Court applied the standard used in Mississippi University far 
Women v. Hogan22 to determine if gender discrimination existed at 
VMp3 Under this test, Virginia first had to demonstrate an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for excluding women from the citizen-
soldier training of VMp4 To meet this requirement, Virginia argued 
that single-sex education provided diversity in the state's educational 
system.25 The Commonwealth also claimed that VMI's program would 
There are enough similarities between VWIL and VMI to ensure a similar outcome of 
successful careers and leadership. See id. at 4-7. "In short, the goals of VWIL and VMI are the 
same, and the methodologies employed to attain those goals have many of the same elements." 
Id. at 7. 
The differences are such that the women in VWIL would achieve the goals of the program, 
and therefore students' needs were considered first and foremost. See id. at 5 (Mary Baldwin 
College (MBC) would not "compromise student welfare" for "litigation objectives"). In designing 
the program the way it did, MBC felt justified that the Equal Protection Clause did not require 
an identical program to VMI. See id. at 3. 
15 See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 484. 
16 See generally United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995); Cowan, supra note 5, 
at 151-52. 
17 See generally United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995). 
18 See United Statesv. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2264 (1996). 
19 See id. at 2274; see also Cowan, supra note 5, at 152-56. 
20 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269. 
21 See id. at 2287. 
22458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
23 See Land, supra note 5, at 299-307. 
24 See United States v. Virginia. 116 S. Ct. at 2274, 2276. 
25 See id. at 2276. 
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have to be modified to admit women and that modification would 
destroy the uniqueness of the school. 26 The Court did not find these 
justifications to be exceedingly persuasive. 27 
Furthermore, for VMI to survive constitutional scrutiny, Virginia 
had to show that single-sex education was an important governmental 
objective and that the discriminatory means were substantially related 
to the achievement of the objective.28 Virginia did not succeed in 
meeting this end because the Court found that: 
[VMI] offers an educational opportunity no other Virginia in-
stitution provides, and the school's "prestige"-associated 
with its success in developing "citizen-soldiers"-is un-
equaled. Virginia has closed this facility to its daughters and, 
instead, has devised for them a "parallel program," with a 
faculty less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more 
limited course offerings, fewer opportunities for military 
training and for sci en tific specialization .... Women seeking 
and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be offered any-
thing less, under the State's obligation to afford them genu-
inely equal protection. 29 
The Court found that Virginia's desire to maintain an all-male 
educational institution was not a legitimate government objective.3o 
Overall, VMI perpetuated the stereotypical view that only men 
should receive military training.31 In addition, the all-women military 
institute created by Virginia was not a constitutional solution because 
men and women were not treated substantially equal, and in com pari-
26 See id. 
27 See id. at 2282. 
28 See id. at 2271. 
29 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287. 
30 See id. at 2282. 
31 See Brief of Twenty-Six Private Women's Colleges [Bennett College (NC), Brenau Women's 
College (GA), Chatham College (PA) , College of the St. Benedict (MN), College of the St. 
Catherine (MN), College of the St. Elizabeth (NJ) , College of the St. Mary (NE), Columbia 
College (SC), Hartford College for Women (CT), Lesley College (MA), Marymount College-
Tarrytown (NY), Midway College (Ky), Mount St. Mary's College (CA), Mount Vernon College 
(D.C.), Notre Dame College of Ohio, Pine Manor College (PA), Russell Sage College (NY), St. 
Mary's College (IN), St. Mary-of-the-Woods College (IN), Seton Hill College (PA) , Spelman 
College (GA) , Trinity College (D.C.), Trinity College of Vermont, Ursuline College (OH), Wilson 
College (PA)] as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 
2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter Brief of Twenty-Six]. Men were favored in 
receiving military and leadership training because of past discrimination against women in this 
field. See id. 
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son with VMI, the all-women institute fell short in several areas includ-
ing "breadth of curricular offerings, endowment, reputation, facilities, 
strength of alumni networks, and prestige. "32 
B. The Language of the United States v. Virginia Decision and 
Women's Colleges 
Although the United States v. Virginia decision did not explicitly 
mention other single-sex colleges or programs, certain language in 
the opinion may be interpreted to support the continued viability of 
women's colleges.33 Justice Ginsburg discussed the concepts of citizen-
ship, differences between men and women, the injustices inherent in 
classifications, and the use of classifications to remedy injustices.34 
The Court recognized the fact that women are denied "full citi-
zenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in 
and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capaci-
ties" in our society.35 Equal protection is violated "when a law or official 
policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizen-
ship stature. "36 This language is particularly important to supporters of 
women's colleges because those institutions help women attain full 
citizenship stature, while not minimizing men's, and therefore cannot 
be said to violate equal protectionY 
The Court also acknowledged that there are differences between 
men and women, but that these differences should not be used against 
women, or men. 38 The Court noted that the differences between 
men and women are not reasons to denigrate an individual or put 
constraints on opportunity.39 Women's colleges recognize these differ-
ences, and emphasize the methods by which women learn best.40 These 
methods are used to help women succeed in college, rather than 
restraining either genderY 
321d. at 11; see United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282-87. 
33 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7; see also Cowan, supra note 5, at 148, 
159; Land, supra note 5, at 310-11. 
34 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275-76, 2282, 2286-87. 
351d. at 2275. 
36ld. 
37 See infra Part III.A.2.b-c Uustifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
38 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. 
39 See id. 
40 See infra Part IIIA.2.b-c Uustifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
41 See infra Part III.A.2.b-c Uustifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
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The Court recognized that sex classifications can create injustices42 
and that such classifications cannot be used "to create or perpetuate 
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women."43 Although sex 
classifications may have an adverse effect on women when used in the 
context of all-male institutions, women's colleges do not produce the 
same effect; indeed they have the opposite effect by helping women 
achieve legal, social, and economic equality.44 
Most importantly, the Court noted that sex classifications may be 
legitimate when they are used to create equalities between the sexes 
and remedy past injustices against women.45 "Sex classifications may be 
used to compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities [they 
have] suffered,' ... to 'promote equal employment opportunity,' ... 
[and] to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our 
Nation's people."46 The gender classifications of women's colleges help 
women achieve economic and career success by teaching women how 
to reach leadership positionsY 
Women's colleges are drastically different in the areas that made 
VMI's single-gender education unconstitutiona1.48 First, VMI's gender 
classification helped to perpetuate past injustices.49 Women were cate-
gorically excluded from the educational opportunities at VMI, and this 
exclusion could only be remedied by the elimination of the past and 
future discrimination at VMpo Women's colleges, on the other hand, 
help remedy past injustices against women.51 
Second, women were excluded from opportunities by being ex-
cluded from VMI. Qualified women could not take part in the training 
that VMI offered. 52 The newall-women leadership institute in Virginia 
did not remedy the equal protection violation, since women who met 
admissions requirements and wanted a VMI education were barred 
from receiving such an education and were expected to attend an 
42 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. 
43Id. 
44 See infra Part III.A.2.b-c (Justifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
45 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. 
46Id. (citations omitted). 
47 See infra Part III.A.2.b-c (Justifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
48 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282, 2286-87. 
49 See id. at 2282. 
50 See id. 
51 See infra Part III.A.2.b-c (Justifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
52 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2286-87. 
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inferior educational institution.53 In contrast, women's colleges afford 
women new leadership opportunities. 54 
III. THE ALL-WOMEN COLLEGE ISSUE UNDER THE CURRENT LAW 
A. lVhy Women's Colleges are Necessary and Pass Constitutional Muster 
1. Unlike VMI, Women's Colleges are not State Actors and are 
Protected by Congressional Intent 
a. Most Women's Colleges are Private 
VMI's violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is found in the fact that VMI is a public school, sup-
ported by state funds, and it decreased educational opportunities for 
women by excluding them.55 Unlike the publicly supported VMI, most 
women's colleges are private.56 This difference is the most obvious 
53 See id. at 2286. Even though the remedial program was not a legitimate substitute for a 
VMI education, on its own merits, it could serve as an educational opportunity for women that 
the Court might deem legitimate because it offers women more leadership opportunities. See, 
e.g., Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 3-20. 
The all-women's military programs that were created as a remedy to VMl's constitutional 
violations could be salvaged. There were many benefits of the VWIL. It was "an extraordinary 
educational opportunity for women." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents by Dr. 
Kenneth E. Clark et al. at 3, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94--1941, 
94--2107) [hereinafter Brief of Clark]. The VWIL was created by people who wished "the advance-
ment of women in every aspect of society," thus rejecting any stereotypes regarding the abilities 
and roles of women. See id. at 2, 4. 
The mission and goals ofVWIL replicated those of the VMI program. See id. at 4. The creators 
did not see gender as limiting one's role in society, and the VWIL prepares women to be leaders 
in every field. See id. at 4, 9. The program was created to give women a unique and valuable 
opportunity rather than superficial equality. See id. at 4. 
Mary Baldwin College (MBC) was one of the schools which designed a women's program. 
School authorities described the founding principles of VWIL: 
First, MBC believes that single-sex education conveys unique educational benefits 
and should be available to both women and men. Second, MBC is convinced that 
a wide array of educational options is crucial to the future strength of this Nation 
and should be publicly available. Third, VWIL presents an extraordinary opportu-
nity; it is a forward-looking program which serves a real need for the young women 
of today. 
Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1. 
54 See infra Part III.A.2.b-c (Justifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
55 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269-79,2282. The Fourteenth Amendment states 
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
56There are eighty-four private women's colleges, two public women's colleges and three 
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reason why women's colleges are not unconstitutional under United 
States v. Virginia. 57 
Some amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in the VMI case es-
poused the view that the existence of private all-women colleges would 
be threatened ifVMI were to lose the case.58 They contend that it would 
private men's colleges. See Mike Allen, Separatism Is In, Except fur R1tite Men, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 1996, § 4, at 5; Barry Shlachter, Women's University Thrives R1tile Bucking Trend, Hous. 
CHRON., Oct. 31, 1993, at 5. The two public all-women colleges are Texas Woman's University 
and Rutgers University Douglass College. See Shlachter, supra, at 5. "Texas Woman's University 
survives, even thrives, as a predominantly women's school that allows men into only a few 
specialized programs." ld. The school survived even though the legislature contemplated merging 
it with another school, because of its clearly defined mission. See id. Its undergraduate department 
is closed to men, because men could get a similar liberal arts education at a nearby public school. 
See id. Douglass College is the women's college at Rutgers. See James Ahearn, After VMl Ruling, 
Is Douglass Safe?, RECORD (New Jersey), Oct. 13, 1996, at 2. Douglass has denied admission to 
men since 1918, when it was founded as the New Jersey College for Women. See id. The college 
sets its own admissions standards and conducts its own graduation ceremonies. See id. Douglass 
students take Rutgers courses, which are open to all students. See id. The professors are Rutgers 
professors. See id. Douglass may be safe for those reasons, as well as because of the fact that 
Douglass is not a legal entity. See id. It is "essentially part ofa co-educational university enterprise." 
ld. The three private all-male colleges are Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, Wabash College 
in Indiana, and Morehouse College in Georgia [along with Hobart College in New York, which 
is coordinate with an all-women college, William Smith]. See Spencer S. Hsu, Male-Only Still The 
Only Way fur Hampden-Sydney College, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1996, at C1; see also Pyle, supra note 
5, at 235; Cowan, supra note 5, at 140; Lawyers Wrong, Private Schools Say, RICHMOND TIMES-DIS-
PATcH,June 25,1991, at Bl. 
57 The organization engaging in the discriminatory practice must be a state actor. See Feld-
blum et al., supra note 2, at 193; Land, supra note 5, at 312-13, 323. Other challenges can be 
made under state law, for further discussion, see Feldblum, supra note 2, at 181-93 (state public 
accommodation statutes), and 199-202 (states' equal rights amendments). 
The case of Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D. S.C. 1970), discussed the issue of public 
all-women colleges and found them constitutional. Male plaintiffs sued to gain entrance into 
Winthrop College in South Carolina. See id. at 135. The court upheld the single-gender character 
of the school. See id. at 139. The college was "designed as a school for young ladies" offering 
"courses thought to be specially helpful to female students." ld. at 136. The case was decided on 
a rational basis test (which has since been changed to intermediate scrutiny as a result of Hogan 
and United States v. Virginia). See id. at 137; see also infra Part I11.A.2.a. (for the Supreme Court's 
intermediate scrutiny construction for gender discrimination cases). The school was all-female 
because of the "better educational advantages." Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 137. 
Male students in South Carolina had a range of other schools from which to choose. See id. 
"There is no suggestion that there is any special feature connected with Winthrop that will make 
it more advantageous educationally to them than any number of other State-supported institu-
tions." ld. at 138. There were no courses in particular that the plaintiffs wished to take. See id. 
"It is not intimated that Winthrop offers a wider range of subject matter or enjoys a position of 
outstanding prestige over the other State-supported institutions in this State whose admission 
policies are coeducational." ld. at 138-39. The male plaintiffs had no reason to change the 
single-sex character of Winthrop College. [Winthrop College, now Winthrop University, became 
coeducational in 1974. EDWARD T. CUSTARD, THE BIG BOOK OF COLLEGES 1174 (1996).]. 
58 See Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 2. This assumption was supported by Justice 
Scalia in his dissent. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2264, 2306-07. "The potential of 
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be more difficult to justify an educational program, public or private, 
that only allows women.59 Other amicus briefs spelled out the reasons 
why private women's colleges would not be affected by the Court's 
ruling in VMI: ''VMI is a public institution; it has an admissions policy 
that limits enrollment to men; and it has a mission that perpetuates 
the traditional stereotype of men as soldiers."6o Women's colleges are 
different from VMI since their mission is to increase women's educa-
tional opportunities.61 
b. What the Public/Private Distinction Means for Women's Colleges 
Although the Equal Protection Clause applies only to state actors 
(public schools), some have contended that the public/private distinc-
tion may not be enough to shield women's colleges because private 
schools and their students receive both federal and state funding. 62 
Women's colleges receive about twenty percent of their operating costs 
from the government, and their students receive government loans.63 
If these government benefits were characterized by a court as public 
funding, that court could also find that state action exists, and withhold 
this money from women's colleges because their admissions policies 
discriminate against men.64 The VMI ruling could mean that govern-
today's decision for widespread disruption of existing institutions lies in its application to private 
single-sex education." Id. at 2306. 
59 See Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 20. Educators experimenting with single-sex 
programs also saw a potentially expansive impact of the Court's ruling in this case-they were 
concerned that a decision against VMI would jeopardize all the single-sex public schools in the 
country beyond higher education and could possibly endanger single-sex private schools. See Brief 
of Women's Schools Together, Inc. et al. at 27, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) 
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter Brief of Women's Schools]. 
60 Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 4. 
61 See id. at 2. 
62 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 210, 214, 221; Cowan, supra note 5, at 161-64. "When the Court 
reaches a Brown-type conclusion for gender segregation cases, all public women's colleges have 
to integrate, and all private women's colleges will begin to lose their grip on direct government 
subsidies." Pyle, supra note 5, at 215. 
63 See Karla Cooper-Boggs, Note, The Link Between Private and Public Single-Sex Colleges: Will 
Wellesley Stand or Fall with The Citadel?, 29 IND. L. REv. 131, 137 (1995). "Nationwide, private 
colleges receive an average 18 percent of their funds from federal and state governments." 
Women's Colleges Next?, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, July 2, 1996, at A6. Private colleges also have 
preferential treatment from tax-exempt status. See id. This tax-exempt status is seen as crucial to 
higher education. See id. They also receive help through student grants and loans that pay tuition. 
See id. Nearly 75% comes from the federal government. See id. At Wellesley College, federal and 
state funding for undergraduates totaled $5.6 million in 1990-91. See id. At Mount Holyoke 
College, "federal funds account for 3.8 percent of the budget" and at Spelman College, "they 
account for 14.2 percent." Id.; see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 212. 
64 See Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 140; Cowan, supra note 5, at 163-68. 
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mental financial support would no longer be available to women's 
schools or that their tax-exempt status could be withdrawn.65 Their 
tax-exempt status could be affected if a court were to determine that 
women's colleges violate public policy by denying men educational 
opportunities.66 Private colleges would not be able to survive without 
government grants, tax-exempt status, and student loans.67 If a court 
found a link between the states and the colleges strong enough to 
support a finding of state action, women's colleges could be defined 
as public institutions subject to the same reasoning that forced VMI to 
become coeducational. 68 
i. Women's Colleges Are Not State Actors 
A finding of state action usually requires state involvement in the 
school's policies or the institution's performance of traditional govern-
ment functions. 69 As such, courts have been unwilling to find state 
action in cases involving the actions of private colleges and universities 
merely based on factors such as educational services, regulation by the 
65 See Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 23, 25-28; see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 215, 
219; Cowan, supra note 5, at 138. For a further discussion on tax-exempt status, see Cooper-Boggs, 
supra note 63, at 147-49. Cooper-Boggs explained: 
Currently, the very significant financial benefit of tax exempt status is granted to 
private women's colleges. Under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 
501(c) (3), private colleges are exempt from paying income taxes because they are 
considered "corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." 
Also, under IRC Section 170, financial contributions made to private women's 
colleges are deductible as "charitable contributions." This provision gives private 
women's colleges an additional financial benefit because it encourages taxpayers 
to contribute to the colleges in order to receive a tax deduction .... In summary, 
both the judiciary and the IRS have the power to deny tax exempt status to private 
women's colleges. Such a denial would severely affect a college's finances, and 
would likely lead to the demise or coeducation of many private women's colleges. 
[d. at 147, 149. 
66 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 215-16; Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 148. 
67 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 212; Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 140. 
68 See Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 143; Cowan, supra note 5, at 164-68. For a discussion 
on indirect government support, see Cowan, supra note 5, at 168-73. 
69 See Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 20; see also MARK G. YODOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL 
POLICY AND THE LAw 144 (3d ed. 1992); Cowan, supra note 5, at 164, 166. One commentator 
has noted: 
The mere fact that a private school may be regulated by the state or that it receives 
governmental financial support or that it uses the name of the state in the name 
of the school has not been deemed sufficient involvement to conclude that the 
school's actions were really government action. 
YODOF ET AL., supra, at 144. 
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State, tax-exempt status, or the receipt of state services or funding. 70 
Women's colleges should not be considered state actors. 71 
A Wisconsin court considered the issue of private women's col-
leges and state action. It concluded that state action, including finan-
cial support to the college, did not result in state involvement in the 
college's admission policy or constitute the state's de facto control of 
the college.72 
The Supreme Court has not yet developed a specific test to deter-
mine state action. 73 
There are however, several factors which the Court considers, 
including whether the private organization is engaged in a 
public function, whether the state has encouraged private 
activities, whether the government regulates the private en-
tity, whether there is a symbiotic relationship between the 
government and private entity, and whether the state provides 
funds to the private entity.74 
Various courts' application of the criteria has established a high 
threshold for defining a state actor. 75 Thus, most private actors, even if 
they maintain extensive ties with the government, are not subject to 
direct constitutional attack. 76 For a successful constitutional attack, the 
state needs to exercise coercive power or give significant encourage-
ment such that any decision made by the actor would be considered a 
state decision. 77 As a result, most private organizations are not likely to 
be designated state actors. 78 Women's colleges do not meet most of the 
factors previously discussed-there is limited or no government regu-
lation, there is no symbiotic relationship between the government and 
70 See Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 20. 
71 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 193; Cowan, supra note 5, at 166-68. While the 
Supreme Court has not developed a definitive test, the factors that it considers in state action 
cases are not present in the issue of private women's colleges. See Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, 
at 143. But see Cowan, supra note 5, at 164, 168 (discussing three general situations). 
72 See Naranjo v. Alverno College, 487 F. Supp. 635, 637 (E.D. Wis. 1980). It must be noted 
that this case was decided two years before Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718 (1982). See Cowan, supra note 5, at 167. For other cases involving private schools, see id. at 
166-68. 
73 See Cowan, supra note 5, at 164-66 (for discussion of situations where private actions are 
equated with state action). 
74 Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 143. 
75 See Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 194. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 195; see also Cowan, supra note 5, at 164, 166. 
78 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 199; Cowan, supra note 5, at 166. 
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private women's colleges, and the government funding does not meet 
the high threshold set by the courts to be a state actor. 
ii. Tax-Exempt Status and Congressional Intent 
Women's colleges should not find their tax-exempt status threat-
ened because they do not violate public policy.79 Furthermore, when 
Congress enacted Title IX, it created an exemption for single-sex 
colleges.8o 
Single-sex colleges would not lose their tax-exempt status as a 
result of United States v. Virginia because they do not violate the public 
policy requirement for tax-exempt status.8! They are "in harmony with 
the public interest" because they allow women, who have been discrimi-
nated against in the past as a group, more opportunities.82 Women's 
colleges can establish that they further an important public policy 
interest because they exist to create equality in society.83 
Through Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,84 which 
preserved single-gender undergraduate schools, Congress legitimated 
79 See Brief of Twenty:Six, supra note 31, at 23 (discussing Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574, 592, 598 (1983)). But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 215-16 (arguing that tax 
exemption to women's colleges may be against public policy). Justice Scalia concluded in his 
dissent that "it is certainly not beyond the Court that rendered today's decision to hold that a 
donation to a single-sex college should be deemed contrary to public policy and therefore not 
deductible if the college discriminates on the basis of sex." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 
2264,2306-07 (1996). 
80 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 21l. 
81 See Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 23 (discussing Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 
592,598). 
82 Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 203. The exemption will only be vulnerable if a govern-
ment official decides to revoke it, which has not been done yet with a women's college. See id. at 
204. In Trustees of Smith College v. Board of Assessors, the local tax assessors attempted to tax a 
parcel of Smith College's land under the theory that, as an all-female college, Smith is precluded 
from receiving tax exemption. See 434 N.E.2d 182, 183 (Mass. 1982). The court ruled that the 
tax-exempt status had to be challenged by the Attorney General or the Commissioner. See id. at 
184; see also Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 147: 
In 1982, the tax exempt status of Smith College was challenged on the theory that 
because its admission policy was discriminatory, it should not be considered a 
"charitable institution." In that case, the court strictly applied the language of the 
IRC, finding that because Smith was an "educational institution," it was exempt 
from paying taxes. 
Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 147. 
83 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 224. 
84 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (a) (West 1990) states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except that 
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women's colleges.85 In the case of Naranjo v. Alverno College, the Wis-
consin court found that the express language of Title IX did not apply 
to admissions policies of private undergraduate institutions.86 It seems 
that Congress has preserved the role of all-women colleges in further-
ing equality of economic and career opportunities for women. By 
this analysis, the invalidation of VMl's all-male status does not affect 
the viability of private women's colleges.87 Furthermore, undermining 
women's colleges by thwarting their admissions policies and goals is "a 
dubious use of legal resources. "88 
2. All-Women Education Provides Educational Benefits-An 
Exceedingly Persuasive Justification for Excluding Men from 
Women's Colleges 
Even if the federal courts were to expand the scope of the state 
action concept, the courts should still uphold the right of women's 
colleges to stay single-sex under current law.89 An important concern 
is the purpose of the women's colleges, which "operate to dissipate, 
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications. ''90 
Id. 
... in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply only 
to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher 
education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education ... [and] 
in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution of 
undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and con-
tinually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one 
sex .... 
85 SteBrief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 24; Cowan, supra note 5, at 171; Land, supra note 
5, at 321-22. 
86 See Naranjo v. Alverno College, 487 F. Supp. 635, 637 (E.D. Wis. 1980). 
87 See Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 26. For a further discussion of other Congressional 
options, such as the Commerce Clause, see Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 149-51, which 
concludes: 
These cases show that Congress certainly has the power, through the Commerce 
Clause, to regulate the admissions policies of women's colleges, and that the Court 
would likely approve this regulation. As the McClung Court noted, "the power of 
Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and 
violates no express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going 
back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere." 
Id. at 15l. 
88Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 106, 144 (1986). 
89 See Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 193. "[Clreative litigation strategies in choosing the 
party to be sued may expand the number of cases in which state action would be found in the 
interaction between government and private organizations." Id. at 199. But see Pyle, supra note 
5, at 260-63 (rejecting both the special environment and affirmative action defenses). 
90 Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 5. 
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a. Courts' Current Construction Jor Gender Discrimination Cases 
Women's colleges stand in stark contrast to VMI, and would sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny.91 Under the precedents of Mississippi Uni-
versity Jor Women v. Hogan and United States v. Virginia, the test to 
determine whether all-women colleges can maintain policies that ex-
clude men would be the "exceedingly persuasive justification" test.92 
The United States v. Virginia opinion explains the Court's current 
direction for cases regarding gender-based classifications. Under the 
Court's holding, courts are to examine the "differential treatment or 
denial of opportunity for which relief is sought" to determine if there 
is an equal protection violation.93 The burden rests on the state to show 
that the classification serves important government objectives and the 
means employed are substantially related to the objective.94 
Several criteria can be inferred from Mississippi University Jor Wo-
men v. Hogan. 95 The gender negatively affected "must have suffered a 
disadvantage related to the classification. "96 The policy must have been 
adopted with the intention of overcoming disadvantages97 and cannot 
perpetuate stereotypes about the disadvantaged group.98 In addition, 
the policy must also in fact help the gender negatively affected to 
overcome disadvantages.99 
b. justifications Jor Women's Colleges 
Because women's colleges treat men and women differently by ex-
cluding men, they would have to articulate an "exceedingly persuasive 
91 See generally Cowan, supra note 5, at 161-83; Land, supra note 5, 312-23. For more 
discussion of the scrutiny standard that the Court may use in future single-sex education cases, 
see Pyle, supra note 5, at 219-33, concluding that 'Justice Ginsburg's opinion came as close to 
strict scrutiny as possible without actually embracing it." [d. at 233; see also Cowan, supra note 5, 
at 143-47, 152-56, 17~77; Land, supra note 5, at 299-306,317-21. 
92 See United Statesv. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264,2275 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 230; Land, supra note 5, at 302-07. 
Commentators have noted that single-sex schools may face "skeptical scrutiny" in the future. See 
Pyle, supra note 5, at 230-33. For the development of the intermediate scrutiny standard, see 
Cowan, supra note 5, at 143-47. 
93 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275. 
94 See id. 
95 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 260-69; Cowan, supra note 5, at 145-47; Land, supra note 5, at 
302-06. 
96 Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 210,219. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 211,219; see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 264-65. 
99 See Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 211, 219. 
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justification" to remain constitutionally viable. lOo Generally, justification 
can take two forms. IOl The first is a remedial rationale. lo2 Under this 
justification, the short-term objective of women's colleges is to over-
come women's historical disadvantages. lo3 The true purpose must be 
the objective of compensating women for past discrimination,104 such 
that full educational development in women is fostered. 105 The second 
form of justification is pluralism. lo6 Under this justification, women's 
colleges must show that "single-sex education promotes values of cul-
tural diversity and personal association. "107 The rationale is that diver-
sity of school settings better serves students' needs. lOS 
The compensatory purpose doctrine, as applied to women's col-
leges, is appropriate when the disadvantages women suffer are not the 
result of a rule or policy that can be removed, invalidated, or remedied 
by statute. 109 Such disadvantages must be a result of "long-standing and 
deeply embedded notions regarding the proper roles of men and wo-
men."IIOThe compensatory purpose doctrine also ensures that women 
have the opportunity to achieve equality with men by combating the 
disadvantages they face. 111 Under this doctrine, a school would have to 
show that the compelling government interest in excluding males 
"compensates women for the continuing effects of historical discrimi-
nation."112 The Court in United States v. Virginia held that there must 
be a genuine justification, not a hypothetical or post hoc justification, 
"[a]nd it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the differ-
ent talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females."113 
100 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
101 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 235-36; Rhode, supra note 88, at 140. 
102 See Rhode, supra note 88, at 140; Land, supra note 5, at 317. One commentator called 
this "the affirmative action justification." Pyle, supra note 5, at 235. However, commentators have 
rejected this justification. See Pyle, supra note 5, at 261-63; Cowan, supra note 5, at 142, 177-81. 
103 See Rhode, supra note 93, at 140; Cowan, supra note 5, at 142, 177. 
104 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 198, 205. 
105 See Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological 
Sex Diffcrences, 38 Sw. LJ. 617, 682 (1984). 
106 See Rhode, supra note 88, at 140. 
107Id. One commentator has called this "the special needs, special environment justification." 
Pyle, supra note 5, at 236. Some commentators have rejected this justification. See id. at 260-61. 
108 See Browne, supra note 105, at 682. 
109 See Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 214. 
110 Id. 
III See id. at 214-15. 
112 Sara L. Mandelbaum, ''As VMI Goes . .. ": The Domino Effect and Other Stubborn Myths, 6 
SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 979, 982 (1996). 
mUnited States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996). 
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Some consider the remedial theory, under which women's col-
leges serve to remedy past discrimination, to be a weak argument,1I4 
especially in the area of higher education.1l5 Opponents of the reme-
dial theory contend that discrimination against women has not seem-
ingly affected access to a college education.1I6 Access to the educational 
system seems to be completely unobstructed for women. ll7 The major-
ity of American college students are women, about fifty-four percent, 
and women generally receive higher grades than men. liS As one com-
mentator put it, 'The coeds have become the eds. "119 
However, such contentions distort the issue. Discrimination 
against women, which is the focus of the remedial action, is not only 
about possible discrimination that occurs in colleges, it is also about 
the remedial action that is applied to thwart the discrimination felt 
afterwards.120 Women's colleges prepare women for success in society 
and their remedial purpose lies therein.l2l 
114 See Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 20. 
115 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 235~3 (challenging the remedial theory as applied to women's 
colleges); Cowan, supra note 5, at 178-81 (considering the Court's recent decisions in race based 
affirmative action). Some commentators have challenged the data used to support the remedial 
theory for women's colleges. See Pyle, supra note 5, at 237. ''The data favoring separate schools 
and colleges for women seems copious, particularly when compared to the data on the benefits 
of all-male institutions." Id. Some commentators have challenged the notion that women's 
colleges remedy past discrimination. See Cowan, supra note 5, at 179-80. One commentator stated 
that: 
Thus to pass constitutional muster, a remedial program must be narrowly tailored 
to remedy past discrimination against specific individuals. Clearly, this would be a 
difficult test for private women's colleges to meet, since many oftheir students have 
not previously been rejected by co-educational schools and women constitute more 
than fifty percent of college students. 
Id. Commentators have noted the weaknesses in relying on the remedial theory in light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions striking down race-based affirmative action. Id. at 180. "If strict scrutiny 
were instituted for sex-based classifications, the Court similarly could rule unconstitutional statu-
tory exemptions that allow private women's colleges to receive federal funding in spite of the fact 
that their admissions policies discriminate on the basis of sex." Id. 
116 See Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 21; see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 240-41 ("more 
girls than boys go on to higher education"); Cowan, supra note 5, at 179-80 (women's college 
students were not rejected by coeducational schools). 
117 See Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 22; see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 240; Cowan, 
supra note 5, at 179-80. 
118 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 240-41; Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 146; Cowan, supra note 
5, at 179-80; Peter Schrag, The Mills and Wellesley ~estions, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 30, 1990, at 
B6. 
119Schrag, supra note 118, at B6. 
120 See, e.g., Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 180-81; Mandelbaum, supra note 112, at 982-83. 
But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 235, 262. (concluding that "[tlhere is no proof that excluding men 
from women's colleges makes equality of opportunity for women more likely after graduation."). 
121 See, e.g., Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 180-81; Mandelbaum, supra note 112, at 982-83. 
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Women are underrepresented in leadership positions. 122 They are 
over-represented on the lower end of the pay scale. 123 Society as a whole 
is not responsive to problems "that pervasively and disproportionately 
affect women, such as sexual assault, battering, sexual objectification, 
workplaces inhospitable to pregnancy and childrearing, and attacks 
on abortion providers, clinics, and patients .... "124 Also, activities as-
signed to women are devalued in comparison to the activities assigned 
men, and women themselves are likewise devalued in comparison to 
men.125 
c. Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges 
If the policies of a women's college policies were challenged, that 
school could first show that by excluding men, the school provides a 
leadership program for women. 126 The school could show through 
But see Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, The Myths and Justifications of Sex Segregation in Higher Education: 
VMI and The Citade~ 4 DUlrnj. GENDER L. & POL'y 101, 118; Pyle, supra note 5, at 235. 
122 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not {,y Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 21, 31 (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] (noting women's 
"comparative lack of presence in tenured faculties, Congress, the courts, executive boardrooms, 
university presidencies, editorships of newspapers and publishing houses"). 
123 See id. at 24-25 (noting that "[m]ost women work ... in the female job ghetto, in 
high-heeled, low-status jobs with low pay," that women bring "home fifty-three to fifty-nine cents 
to the average male dollar," and that "[e]ven adjusted for education and years worked, women 
make less"). 
124 Finley, supra note 1, at 1125; see also Tracy Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. 
L. REv. 1657, 1674 (1997); see, e.g., MACKINNON, Not {,y Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis 
Schlafly, supra note 122, at 21-31 (statistics); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122, at 46, 51-52 (statistics); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, A 
Rally against Rape, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122, at 81,81-84 (rape); CATHARINE A. 
MAcKINNON, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122, at 85, 
85-92 (violence against women); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade 
in Court, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra notc 122, at 103, 103-16 (sexual harassment); 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122, at 146, 
146-62 (pornography). As MacKinnon comments: 
How do you know when a group is on the bottom? It may be some indication when 
they can be assaulted, and authorities ignore them; physically abused, and people 
turn away or find it entertaining; economically deprived, and it is seen as all they 
are worth; made the object of jokes, and few ask what makes the jokes funny; imaged 
as animallike, confined to a narrow range of tasks and functions, and told it is all 
harmless or inevitable and even for their benefit as well as the best they can expect, 
given what they are. These are all true for women. 
MACKINNON, Not {,y Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly, supra note 122, at 30. 
125 See Speeches: Single Gender Education and the Constitution, 40 Loy. L. REv. 253, 254 (1994) 
[hereinafter Speeches]. The panel discussion was held at the annual American Bar Association 
Convention in 1994. Id. at 253 n.*. Dr. Beth Willinger, Anne Marie Whittemore, Sara L. Mandel-
baum, andJohn Borkowski served on the panel. Id. 
126 See Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 145. 
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studies that women's college graduates have elevated levels of career 
achievement and that there is considerable discrimination against fe-
males in coeducational education. 127 This would bolster the school's 
argument that it serves a compensatory purpose "to redress the effects 
of historical discrimination or disadvantage," thus providing a govern-
mental purpose.128 
The justification for excluding men from admission to women's 
colleges is that women are not always adequately educated in a coedu-
cational environment, suffer disadvantages when they enter the work 
force, and are vastly under-represented in leadership positions in soci-
ety, and that education in women's colleges can offset these trends. 129 
The state objective is to make the leadership in society more repre-
sentative and make society more aware of women's issues. 130 The means 
for achieving these goals is to educate women in an environment that 
enables them to realize their potential and enables them to fulfill 
leadership roles in society.131 
There is ample evidentiary support for preserving women's col-
leges. As a historical matter, such schools began under a policy of 
sexual separation, but evolved into offering a standard academic cur-
riculum. 132 While to the outside world the schools reinforced tradi-
tional roles for women, they also challenged those roles in the class-
room. 133 These schools opened doors for women by giving women an 
education comparable to men's education.134 The leading women's col-
leges also stressed individual achievement. 135 With the women's rights 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, women's colleges reexamined their 
127 See id. 
128 [d. (quoting Stuart Taylor,jr., Standing Up For Single-Sex Education, RECORDER, Oct. 13, 
1994, at 8). 
129 See Pyle, supra note 5, a1235; Cowan, supra note 5, at 141. But see Epstein, supra note 121, 
at 118 (disagreeing that women's colleges are the answer). See generally MACKINNON, Not f7y Law 
Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly, supra note 122, at 21-31 (for examples of women's 
disadvantages in workforce and women's under-representation in leadership positions). 
130 See generally MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122 (for ways in which 
society ignores problems that largely affect only women, and ways that the structure of law and 
society needs to change). 
131 See infra Part IILA.2.c (Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges) (for ways in which 
women's colleges educate their students and prepare them for leadership). 
132 See Rhode, supra note 88, at 128-29. For a more complete discussion of women's college 
education in the United States, see Pyle, supra note 5, at 246-47; Cowan, supra note 5, at 139-42. 
m See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 88, at 131-32. 
134 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 260. 
135 See Rhode, supra note 88, at 134. 
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missions. 136 They began preparing women for expanding opportuni-
ties, especially career training and leadershi p.l37 
The "remaining women's colleges are experiencing a substantial 
increase in applications and enrollment during the 1990's. Many at-
tribute this sudden popularity to the growing opinion that women 
are 'shortchanged' in coeducational settings, the statistical success of 
women's college graduates ... [and the success of] famous women's 
college graduates. "138 The colleges are sending out a message of female 
empowerment. 139 They are also receiving an increase in enrollments 
along with favorable public attention. 140 The newfound interest in 
women's colleges is a response to studies that show "learned silence" 
and lower aspirations on the part of girlS.141 Also contributing to this 
interest are the statistics on drinking, date rape, and violent crime on 
coeducational campuses. 142 
Furthermore, there is proof that women's experiences at coedu-
cational colleges are not equal to those of men. 143 Even though women 
graduate in the same numbers as men from higher educational insti-
tutions, women lack equal opportunities in the classroom. l44 Factors 
that make the university climate "chilly" and negative for women are 
male dominance of classroom discussions, devaluation of women's 
contributions, differential treatment by faculty, and stereotyped expec-
tations. 145 Disparaging remarks and subtle behaviors put women at 
136 See Pyle, supra note 5, at 246-47; Speeches, supra note 125, at 261. 
m See Pyle, supra note 5, at 247; Speeches, supra note 125, at 261. 
138 Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 138-39; see also Cowan, supra note 5, at 141. 
139 See Sandra Reeves & Anne Marriott, A Burst of Popularity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept. 
26,1994, at 105. 
140 See id.; see also Cowan, supra note 5, at 141. 
HI See Reeves & Marriott, supra note 139, at 106. 
142 See id. 
143 See Epstein, supra note 121, at 107. 
144 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 258. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 241-42 (stating sociolo-
gists have found no correlation between discriminatory teaching and classroom participation). 
145 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 177-78 (citing ROBERTA M. HALL, AsSOCIATION OF 
AMERICAN COLLEGES, THE CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A CHILLY ONE FOR WOMEN? (1982)); see also 
Epstein, supra note 121, at UO-II. It is still reported "that faculty members consistently take the 
classroom contributions of male university students more seriously than those of women, ask them 
the more interesting questions and interrupt men less frequently when they speak." Schrag, supra 
note U8, at B6. Studies also show that "women students still seem to be more passive and less 
likely to challenge their male classmates, and more ready to accept men's assumptions and 
conclusions. The women, in short, outnumber men, but the men still dominate the classroom 
and the campus." Id. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 241-42 (citing ROBERTA M. HALL, AsSOCIATION 
OF AMERICAN COLLEGES, THE CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A CHILLY ONE FOR WOMEN? (1982), along 
with other studies that showed the opposite). 
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a significant educational disadvantage. 146 The statIstICs that indicate 
equality has been achieved are misleading. "[T]hey don't reflect the 
way men and women treat each other on campus or regard them-
selves."147 For these reasons, women's colleges are necessary for many 
of today's women. 
Several factors make women's colleges different. Some are integral 
to any school, such as a small student body, a strong emphasis on 
academic content and achievement, high expectations, and a shared 
understanding of the school's mission. 148 Several other factors are 
uniquely present in women's colleges which encourage women to 
thrive. 149 Women control the curriculum, allowing women's values to 
be transmitted. 150 The classroom climate favors women's full participa-
tion. 151 Current coeducational institutions favor a masculine mode of 
learning while women's colleges give everyone an opportunity to suc-
ceed.152 Women set policy for women and serve as mentors and role 
models. 153 Women's colleges may also positively influence their stu-
dents' career choices l54 because women's colleges have an environment 
that produces female leaders.155 Even in United States v. Virginia, advo-
cates of both sides cited numerous studies that show the benefits of 
146 See Feldblum et ai., supra note 2, at 178 (citing ROBERTA M. HALL, AsSOCIATION OF 
AMERICAN COLLEGES, THE CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A CHILLY ONE FOR WOMEN? (1982». 
147 Schrag, supra note 118, at B6. 
148 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 256; see also Epstein, supra note 121, at 113-14; Pyle, supra 
note 5, at 242, 256. "Small, selective, coeducational institutions, where teaching is placed at a 
premium, are known to achieve the same or better for women as single-sex women's colleges. 
Recent research suggests that coeducational schools today are as likely to produce female scien-
tists as are women's colleges." Epstein, supra note 121, at 113-14. 
149 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 256. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at 101 (arguing that 
women's colleges limit opportunities for their students); Pyle, supra note 5, at 236 (stating 
women's colleges are better for some women). 
150 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 256-57. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 236, 244-46 (chal-
lenging the notion that there is a "women's way of reasoning"). "[S]o long as women's colleges 
compete with coeducational schools for the same students, it is not likely that they will develop 
radically distinctive courses of study." Pyle, supra note 5, at 248. 
151 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 257. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 236, 242, 250-51. 
152 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 257. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at 110-11 (arguing 
that women's colleges merely remove women from the hostile coeducational environment); Pyle, 
supra note 5, at 236-37, 242-44 (challenging the argument that women have different educa-
tional needs). 
15~ See Speeches, supra note 125, at 258. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 248. 
154 See Cowan, supra note 5, at 141. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 253-60. 
155 See Brief Amici Curiae of Wells College, Southern Virginia College and Saint Mary'S 
College Supporting Affirmance at 2, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 
94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter Brief of Wells]. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at 114; Pyle, supra 
note 5, at 251-53, 257-60. 
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single-sex education, especially for girls and women.156 They argued 
that the district and appellate courts in the case found an important 
justification for single-gender education.157 "[S]ingle-sex schools lead 
to higher achievement and self-esteem in women, encourage women 
to pursue traditionally male-dominated careers, and alleviate some of 
the disadvantages a number of women may suffer in a coeducational 
setting. "158 
Others have noted that "[c]ompared with coeducational institu-
tions, women's colleges reportedly have fostered greater verbal asser-
tiveness, higher career aspirations, more intellectual self-esteem, ex-
panded leadership opportunities, enhanced faculty-student contact, 
greater access to female role models, and more opportunities for 
women faculty or administrators. "159 Women at all-women colleges have 
superior academic records, are less likely to drop out of college, and 
have higher achievements after graduation.16o "Many of our country's 
modern female role models attended women's colleges."161 
By developing in a safe, comfortable learning environment, wo-
men learn "skills that will enable them to participate equally in mixed-
sex activities."162 Women's colleges are effective in preparing women 
156 See Brief of Clark, supra note 53, at 9; Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 2. "Single-gen-
der education for women greatly increases the chances that a woman will succeed academically, 
pursue a career in a field traditionally associated with men, or assume a leadership role in society." 
Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 2. 
157 See Brief of Wells, supra note 155, at 3; see also Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 2-3. 
15S Brief of Mary Baldwin, supra note 5, at 8-9. For more on successes of women's colleges, 
see id. at 9-20. Some have challenged the correlation between women achievers and women's 
colleges. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 121, at 112-14 (arguing that the data is unreliable); Pyle, 
supra note 5, at 25~0 (challenging the notion that women's colleges are "better at teaching or 
inspiring women"); Rhode, supra note 88, at 141 (stating that "the correlation of women achievers 
with women's schools took on an unwarranted causal significance"); Speeches, supra note 125, at 
268-69 (stating that one "cannot draw a direct correlation between the success of the graduates 
of these women's colleges and the single-sexedness of the environment"). One commentator 
theorized that the correlation was instead based on the selectivity of the college: "the more 
selective the college, the more ambitious and distinguished its alumnae are likely to be." Pyle, 
supra note 5, at 259. 
I59Rhode, supra note 88, at 141; see also Land, supra note 5, at 313-15 (advantages), 315-16 
(disadvantages). But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 248-60 (challenging the notion that women's 
colleges are better at teaching or inspiring women). 
160 See Browne, supra note 105, at 682; see also Speeches, supra note 125, at 256 (for statistics). 
But see Finley, supra note 1, at 1103-04 (detailing how separate may not mean equal when it 
comes to women and men); Pyle, supra note 5, at 253-60 (challenging the notion that women's 
colleges are better at teaching or inspiring women); Land, supra note 5, at 315-16 (noting similiar 
benefits to males who attend single-sex schools). 
161 Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 138. But see Pyle, supra note 5, at 257-60. 
162 Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 174. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at 118; Pyle, supra 
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for their many roles in society.163 By offering a challenging academic 
atmosphere, women's colleges aid women in realizing their potential 
and in building and becoming part of networks that will be useful in 
their lives. 164 Thus, the intellectual development of women is enhanced 
when they have the opportunity to study in a single-gender environ-
ment. 165 
B. Men Suing to Enter Women's Colleges 
Few cases of men wishing to enter women's colleges have reached 
the courts. 166 The following account is a hypothetical which poses some 
issues that could occur if such a lawsuit were to be brought. 
A male student, upon hearing that women were to be admitted to 
the Citadel and VMI, decides that he would like to receive an education 
from one of the prestigious private women's colleges. He is interested 
in these colleges for a variety of reasons. 
He thinks it is important to learn what it means to be marginal-
ized. He is fascinated by women's history and women's studies, and 
believes that the women's colleges have stronger programs and better 
female professors. 
He is also impressed by the school's success in getting students 
into graduate programs, and has noticed a high acceptance rate to the 
graduate program which he hopes to enter. He also feels that entering 
the women's college will be good preparation for his future career. The 
note 5, at 236, 238-41 (citing the studies that show a loss of self-esteem in coeducational education 
but concluding that none of the "findings indicate that women's colleges provide a solution"); 
Land, supra note 5, at 316. One commentator noted that in one study women's colleges were not 
likely "to make a young woman more assertive, or more likely to compete with men in traditionally 
male pursuits." Pyle, supra note 5, at 252. The study showed "that women's colleges may attract 
a disproportionate number of women who do not desire to lead, but who seek shelter from 
competition." [d. 
163 See Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 2. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at ll8; Land, 
supra note 5, at 316. "It is not self-evident that men must be excluded from women's classes in 
order for women to learn how to be more assertive. It is at least as plausible to assume that if 
women must learn how to be more assertive, they might benefit from having some men to practice 
on." Pyle, supra note 5, at 241. 
164 See Brief of Twenty-Six, supra note 31, at 2. 
165 See id. at 3. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at 118; Pyle, supra note 5, at 252 ("if women 
are to learn how to lead men in an integrated workplace, they probably need some men to 
practice on in college"), 253-60 (challenging the notion that women's colleges are "better at 
teaching or inspiring women"). 
166 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Naranjo v. Alverno 
College, 487 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D. S.C. 1970); 
see also Pyle, supra note 5, at 268. 
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alumni network is quite strong, and he hopes he can break into the 
"old girl's network." 
Even though his grades and SAT scores fall within the desired 
range, he is denied admission because he is male. He files a suit under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment claiming 
that he is being discriminated against because these schools will not 
consider his application. What is the result? 
It would be difficult for the hypothetical male applicant to prove 
that women's colleges should be considered state actors covered by the 
Equal Protection Clause. This is because women's colleges are private, 
and the states in which they are located have no input into the policies 
of those colleges. 167 
The Attorney General would be unlikely to bring suit to revoke 
the tax-exempt status of women's colleges on behalf of a male litigant. 
This is because women's colleges do not violate public policy, and 
courts have been unwilling to allow third parties to initiate such ac-
tions. 168 Congress has granted protection to single-sex colleges by ex-
empting them from certain policies and they have made it explicit in 
the legislation. 169 Thus, statutory language would not aid a litigant in 
his suit against a women's college. Unless there was enough support 
to persuade Congress to change the law, a male litigant would be 
unlikely to succeed using federal statutory law in his suit. 
The hypothetical male applicant would find that an Equal Protec-
tion claim would fail under current law. 170 Even if he could meet the 
167 See Cowan, supra note 5, at 168. 
168 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (for discussion of tax-exempt status). For 
example, the Smith College court did not allow the local tax assessor to bring an action regarding 
tax-exempt status against Smith College. See Trustees of Smith College v. Board of Assessors, 434 
N.E.2d 182, 184 (Mass. 1982). 
169 See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West 1990). 
170 See Land, supra note 5, at 317-21 (discussing important state interest, substantially related 
means, and separate-but-equal). However, Pyle argues: 
[Plrivate women's colleges like Wellesley, Smith, and Mount Holyoke must make 
two inconsistent arguments. First, they must claim to use distinctive educational 
means to achieve distinctive educational ends that could not be attained by admit-
ting men. Second, they must argue that men do not need what they offer, do not 
want it, or can get it elsewhere in a coeducational setting. But just as a woman may 
want a VMI education, so a man may want what a predominately women's college 
has to offer. Not to take such men seriously is to perpetuate the stereo typic view 
that women's colleges are of no great value to anyone but women .... These 
generalizations about group desires may all be true, but it is constitutional error to 
impute such general traits to individual applicants for the purpose of precluding 
their right to apply. 
Pyle, supra note 5, at 267-68. 
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first burden of proving that he is being discriminated against, women's 
colleges (as state actors) would have enough evidence to meet the 
"exceedingly persuasive justification" test. 171 If the court did not believe 
that everything about women's colleges was positive, it would also have 
to consider how society discriminates against women. 172 While the male 
litigant would consider Hogan to be persuasive in his case against 
women's colleges (there, a male litigant won the right to enter a 
nursing program in an all-female college), it could be easily dis tin-
guished. 173 The state's justification in Hogan failed because that college 
actually helped perpetuate the notion that only women should be 
nurses while women's colleges today prepare women for non-tradi-
tional careers. I74 Without precedent to support him, it is unlikely that 
the male litigant would be able to convince a court that women's 
colleges should be integrated. 
C. All-Male Academies Are Not The Same As All-Women Colleges 
The lower courts in United States v. Virginia subscribed to the view 
that all-male education is the same as all-female education.175 Amicus 
educators agreed, declaring that Virginia had the right to consider the 
views of experts in determining which educational methodology was 
best for its schools. 176 Three women's colleges in an amicus brief also 
found single-sex education beneficial to both genders, providing diver-
sity in higher education. 177 While emphasizing the value of all-female 
education, they also found all-male education to be beneficial in a 
materially similar manner. 178 
17l See Land, supra note 5, at 317-22. 
172 See generally MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122. 
173 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719-23 (1982). 
174 See id. at 727-31. 
175 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411-12 (w.n. Va. 1991); see also 
Land, supra note 5, at 313-15. 
176 See Brief of Women's Schools, supra note 59, at 26. 
m See Brief of Wells, supra note 155, at 2; see also Land, supra note 5, at 313-15. By supporting 
the right to a publicly funded all-male education, these colleges hoped to insure the security of 
private women's colleges from constitutional attack and limit the scope of the Court's opinion. 
See Brief of Wells, supra note 155, at 6. While private women's colleges are protected by Title IX 
and the U.S. Constitution, these amici urged that the Court "clear any remaining doubt," since 
these schools could not survive without public funds. See id. The colleges desired a show of 
constitutional support for single-gender higher education from the Court, in both the public and 
private contexts. See id. 
178 See Brief of Wells, supra note 155, at 1-2; see also Land, supra note 5, at 314-15. 
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The studies that the lower courts used to prove that single-sex 
education was beneficial to both sexes actually showed the benefits 
existed for women only. 179 The Supreme Court rejected the justification 
that all-male education is as equally valuable. 180 The all-male academies 
could not be furthering the educational goal of diversity because those 
public all-male academies had been that way since their inception and 
were the norm in an educational system that excluded females. 181 They 
excluded women, not for educational benefits, but because it was not 
a woman's place at that time. 182 By being excluded since the beginning, 
women could not be included in the program without changing it. 183 
Since Virginia failed to create an all-women public program equaling 
VMI's program for men, its claim of educational diversity had to faiI.I84 
Women were long excluded from Virginia higher education until 
the advent of women's colleges, which were initially inferior to the 
men's colleges. 185 Virginia actually created those women's colleges for 
the benefit of men, to prevent women from applying to the prestigious 
"men's colleges."186 When these women's colleges became coeduca-
tional, it was again for the benefit of men. 187 
Until the Court's decision, VMI remained an all-male institution. 
It was only when VMI was threatened that Virginia created an inferior 
program for women, paralleling the advent of women's colleges in 
Virginia since the program was not comparable to VMI's program for 
men. 188 Virginia had a history of keeping the "powerful" institutions 
1'79 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1118; Laurie A. Keco, Note, The Citadel: Last Male Bastion or 
New Training Ground?, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 479, 495 (1996). 
180 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2279 (1996). 
181 See id. at 2277. 
182 See Mandelbaum, supra note 112, at 979-80. 
183 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2273. 
184 See id. at 2277. ''Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained, 
with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational opportunities within 
the State." ld. ''Virginia has elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and opportu-
nities a VMI education affords." !d. at 2269. 
185 See id. at 2278. Justice Ginsburg summarized the history of women in higher education 
in Virginia as follows: "First, protection of women against higher education; next, schools for 
women far from equal in resources and stature to schools for men; finally, conversion of the 
separate schools to coeducation." ld. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 The Court viewed the women's leadership program "as a 'pale shadow' ofVMI in terms 
of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and 
influence." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2285. VMl's prestige was a unique educational 
opportunity in Virginia, and the so-called parallel program ofVWIL was no parallel "with a faculty 
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all-male,189 a history that it was repeating with VMI and VWIL, and a 
pattern that the Court would not allow to continue. 190 
The success of single-sex education may be specific to women 
"because it offers an environment free from female-specific forms of 
educational discrimination, such as silencing, discouragement, and 
male-peer harassment. "191 Coeducational classrooms, in contrast, en-
hance male achievement. 192 "[C) o-educational institutions reflect the 
values, perspectives and the practices of the dominant male culture,"fa-
voring men's participation and perpetuating male dominance.193 Men 
do not get anything more from a single-sex school than from a coedu-
cational institution.194 
Furthermore, single-sex male colleges result in sexism and deroga-
tory attitudes towards women, preserving assumptions of male supe-
riority.195 The all-male military academies especially fostered male 
bonding through harassment and abuse, and stressed competition and 
aggression as modes of interaction.196 A negative atmosphere was cre-
ated, a "hypermasculine ethos, "197 where women were regarded as "sex 
objects" instead of equals. 198 
less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more limited course offerings, fewer opportuni-
ties for military training and for scientific specialization." [d. at 2287. 
189 See id. 
190 The Court decided that women should have the opportunity to partake in the prestige of 
VMI to become citizen-soldiers. See id. at 2282. The state's goal in producing leaders was "not 
substantially advanced by women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their individual 
merit" from VMI. [d. 
191 Finley, supra note 1, at 1118; see also Speeches, supra note 125, at 255. The studies show a 
neutral or negative effect in all male education, and the research is ambiguous. See Finley, supra 
note 1, at 1119; Speeches, supra note 125, at 258. Those males who usually benefit "stand outside 
the white male culture." See Speeches, supra note 125, at 258. VMI and Citadel had the highest 
graduation rates for African-American males in comparison with the other schools in the state. 
See id. at 262. 
192 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1119. 
193 Speeches, supra note 125, at 258. 
194 See id. 
195 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1119. 
196 See Speeches, supra note 125, at 259. 
197 See id. at 270. 
198 See Rhode, supra note 88, at 142. 
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IV. ANOTHER ARGUMENT FOR WOMEN'S 
COLLEGES-ANTI-SUBORDINATION 
A. The Theory 
[Vol. 18:195 
The anti-subordination theory is an evolution of equal protection 
theory that is premised on the belief that "it is inappropriate for certain 
groups in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of 
power in society as a whole. "199 This approach seeks to eradicate power 
inconsistencies through laws and policies which compensate for those 
disparities. 200 
The Supreme Court has not accepted the anti-subordination the-
ory as a constitutional standard, but the standard does demonstrate 
that women are harmed by male military academies and men are not 
harmed by women's colleges.201 The framework focuses on discrimina-
tion and reminds us why the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, to 
redress the subordination of groups of people.202 Current interpreta-
I99Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordinaticm Above AU: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1003, 1007 (1986). Catharine A MacKinnon defines subordination as being "in a position 
of inferiority or loss of power, or to be demeaned or denigrated." See CATHARINE A MAcKINNON, 
Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 
122, at 163, 176. A related concept to anti-subordination theory is MacKinnon's dominance 
approach. See CATHARINE A MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discriminaticm, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 122, at 32, 40-45. She describes it as "an alternative approach, 
one that threads its way through existing law and expresses ... the reason equality law exists in 
the first place." Id. at 40. "[I]t sees the inequalities of the social world from the standpoint of the 
subordination of women to men." Id. at 43. She describes the basis of the approach: 
In this approach, an equality question is a question of the .distribution of power. 
Gender is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female 
subordination. The question of equality, from the standpoint of what it is going to 
take to get it, is at root a question of hierarchy, which-as power succeeds in 
constructing social perception and social reality~erivatively becomes a categorical 
distinction, a difference. 
Id. at 40. She summarizes the approach: 
[S]eeing sex equality questions as matters of reasonable or unreasonable classifica-
tion is part of the way male dominance is expressed in law. If you follow my shift 
in perspective from gender as difference to gender as dominance, gender changes 
from a distinction that is presumptively valid to a detriment that is presumptively 
suspect .... In the dominance approach, sex discrimination stops being a question 
of morality and starts being a question of politics. 
Id. at 44. See generally Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
FeministJurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 635-58 (1983). 
200 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1007. 
201 See Keco, supra note 179, at 499. See generally Colker, supra note 199, at 1054-58. 
202 See Keco, supra note 179, at 499. 
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tions of equal protection may not confer enough constitutional pro-
tection for women. 203 
The analysis asks how the perception of difference begins and 
continues, specifically seeking recognition of the methods by which 
society subordinates women. 204 "An anti-subordination approach to 
equality ... [includes] a contextual effort to analyze power dynamics, 
systems attitudes, and practices that operate explicitly or implicitly to 
maintain social, economic, and political dominance by one group over 
another."205 It examines "the cultural constructions and hierarchies of 
power that have caused differences to be interpreted as inherent and 
as better or worse on a hierarchy of social value and domination. "206 
This perspective examines "both facially differentiating and 
facially neutral policies" and deems them "invidious only if they per-
petuate racial or sexual hierarchy. "207 Race- or sex-specific policies are 
acceptable if they redress subordination,208 because it is difficult to 
achieve true equality through neutral remedies alone.209 There are 
situations where acting in an equal manner would result in perpetuat-
ing existing inequalities.210 
The anti-subordination perspective looks beyond individuals to 
society. It acknowledges that society creates subordination, and then it 
focuses on how subordination affects groups of people.211 
There is an aversion towards discrimination, and the law that has 
developed to deal with it is best explained by the anti-subordination 
principle212 which is consistent with the intent of the Equal Protection 
Clause.213 It is a more effective method than the traditional doctrine 
for viewing discrimination cases since it is a flexible doctrine that per-
mits race- or sex-specific remedies in certain situations to redress prior 
discrimination. 214 The early litigation in women's rights was aimed at 
203 See Higgins, supra note 124, at 1676. 
204 See Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in Title VII 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1038-39 (1996). 
205Finley, supra note I, at 1122. 
206ld. 
207 Colker, supra note 199, at 1007-08. 
208 See id. at 1009-10. 
209 See id. at 1013. 
210 See Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 173; see also MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: 
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, supra note 199, at 164-66. 
211 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1008-09. 
212 See id. at 1011. 
213 See id. at 1012. 
214 See id. at 10 13. 
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prohibiting the state from maintaining gender roles, particularly those 
that subordinate women. 215 This strategy "overestimated the value of 
gender neutrality and underestimated the possibilities for affirmative 
state intervention on behalf of women ... [since] the economic and 
political subordination of women continued. "216 
l. The Supreme Court 
The Court has shown tendencies towards the anti-subordination 
doctrine in recent affirmative action cases,217 although it has also rec-
ognized necessary limitations to the doctrine.218 The focus on stereo-
types and their accuracy is an incomplete step towards an anti-subor-
dination approach because it is a comparative equality framework. 219 
Equality issues can only be considered when there are identically situ-
ated men.220 An anti-subordination analysis could play into the Su-
preme Court's scheme of scrutiny for gender-based classifications.221 
The analysis "offers a criteria for drawing the line" for legitimate 
classifications.222 One criticism of the Court is that the discussion of 
stereotypes obscures the real issues of power, "masculinist supremacy," 
"devaluation of the feminine," and the different opportunities avail-
able to men and women. 223 
215 See Higgins, supra note 124, at 1673. 
216 Id.; see also MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, supra note 199, 
at 32-40 (discussing sex equality); 164-66 MAcKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil 
Rights, and Speech, supra note 199, at 164-66 (discussing neutrality). Women "still have not got 
equal pay, or equal work, [and] far less equal pay for equal work[.]" MACKINNON, Difference and 
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, supra note 199, at 36. 
217 SeeColker, supra note 199, at 1014. At least one commentator has noted Justice Ginsburg's 
subordination focus. See Higgins, supra note 124, at 1678 n.102; see also Stuart Taylor, The Death 
Knell for Single-Sex Public Education?, CONN. L. TRIB.,July 1, 1996, at 28. 
21B See Colker, supra note 199, at 1048. 
219 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1125. 
220 See id.; see also MACKINNON, DijJerence and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, supra note 
199, at 36. 
221 See Higgins, supra note 124, at 1677-78. Higgins also discusses possible shortcomings of 
using an anti-subordination analysis. See id. at 1678. 
222 See id. at 1678. 
223 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1123-24. One commentator has noted that "feminist theorists 
concerned with constitutional interpretation tend to criticize ways in which public and private 
power intersect to facilitate women's subordination." Higgins, supra note 124, at 1670. She has 
commented that "the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to view state responsibility 
broadly, resisting arguments based on state complicity in private subordination." Id. at 1674. 
Feminist Robin West has argued that "[A]t least a good deal of the time, in the name of 
guaranteeing constitutional protection of individual freedom, [the Constitution] also aggressively 
protects the very hierarchies of wealth, status, race, sexual preference, and gender that facilitate 
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2. The Inquiry 
The anti-subordination framework, as proposed by Professor Ruth 
Colker, brings an anti-subordination focus to equal protection analysis. 
The framework modifies the bi-Ievel inquiry that takes place in analyz-
ing an equal protection case. 224 First, the plaintiffs prima facie case is 
examined. 225 The plaintiff would have to show a disparate impact on 
members of the plaintiff's group by the policy or action. 226 Disparate 
impact is considered evidence of subordination. 227 
The inquiry then turns to the defendant's proffered justification 
for the challenged policy or action. 228 Only a goal of anti-subordination 
could serve as justification.229 The state could not use after-the-fact 
justifications to support policies that perpetuated subordination; it 
could only have policies that aim to redress or eradicate subordina-
tion. 230 The analysis acknowledges gender differences, looks at who is 
advantaged and disadvantaged by those differences, and decides if 
liability should be imposed for those policies which reinforce "gender 
differences and women's subordinate position in society. "231 
Commentators have noted that the Supreme Court has left several 
issues open in equal protection analysis232 and the anti-subordination 
those practices of subordination." Id. at 1676 (citing ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION-
ALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 165 (1994». 
224 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1014. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. at 1014-15. 
227 See id. at 1033. "If litigants are to be successful in using law to remedy socially-imposed 
inequalities, the concept of disparate impact must be broadened to include a societal perspective." 
Id. at 1034. 
228 See id. 
229 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1015; see also Higgins, supra note 124, at 1677 (citing 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1307-08 
(1991». 
230 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1015, 1060; see also Higgins, supra note 124, at 1677 (citing 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1307-08 
(1991». "Empirical evidence, no matter how strong, should not be allowed to further subordi-
nation." Colker, supra note 199, at 1043. 
Id. 
231 See Levitsky, supra note 204, at 1038. 
232 See YODOF ET AL., supra note 69, at 761. 
The Supreme Court opinions leave several central issues open ... laws disadvan-
taging women or men are equally problematic, the extent to which women can be 
provided with special benefits, either to offset or compensate for past sex-discrimi-
nation remains unclear . . . . The cases also fail to clarify how ostensibly gender-
neutral actions that markedly disadvantage one sex-either because they are based 
on a sex-specific trait such as childbearing or because they provide special treatment 
to a predominantly single-sex group-are to be decided. 
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theory would change this. The justification inquiry would focus on the 
principle of anti-subordination instead of the less reliable strict and 
in termediate scrutiny analyses. 233 
The essential inquiry would be how policies or actions connect to 
subordination.234 Such an inquiry would require courts to determine 
how the differentiation influences subordination,235 looking to the 
effect of the rule.236 "The trial court would make a specific finding as 
to whether the differentiation contributed to, or redressed, subordina-
tion."237 
Under the anti-subordination framework, institutions could imple-
ment and defend policies and actions without relying on stereotypes, 
which would help eliminate subordination.238 Anti-subordination 
makes the entire equal protection analysis more meaningful,239 
B. Male Military Academies-Anti-subordination Analysis 
VMI would fail an anti-subordination inquiry because the policy 
had a disparate impact on women, and the policy had no anti-subor-
dination goa1.240 Men have an interest in perpetuating the status quo 
because preserving gender distinctions means preserving the rewards 
that men derive from them.241 Since our society favors men over wo-
men, all-male institutions operate to preserve privilege.242 VMI is a 
perfect example of such an attempt at preservation.243 The school is a 
233 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1015. 
234 See id.; see also Higgins, supra note 124, at 1677 (citing Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflec-
tions on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281,1318-19 (1991)). 
235 See Colker, supra note 199, at 1033. 
236 See id. at 1060. 
237Id. 
238 See id. at 1059. 
239 See id. 
240 See Keco, supra note 179, at 498-99 (making this conclusion regarding the Citadel). It is 
also important to consider "how a single-sex institution connects with the society as a whole." 
Judith Shapiro, School of One's Own, Why Women's Colleges Work, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 
1994, at B5. 
241 See Levitsky, supra note 204, at 1040; see also Epstein, supra note 121, at 117-18. 
242 See Shapiro, supra note 240, at B5; see also Epstein, supra note 121, at 117-18. "Women's 
institutions challenge privilege and attempt to expand access to the good things in life." Shapiro, 
supra note 240, at B5. 
243 See Keco, supra note 179, at 499 (discussing the Citadel); Shapiro, supra note 240, at B5. 
It is not hard to imagine that an all-male military college was funded in the 1800s 
with the objective of keeping women in their proper place: out of college, and out 
of the military. Even though such a policy was a natural by-product of the culture 
and was not evidence of hatred towards women, it was nonetheless subordination. 
Keco, supra note 179, at 499. 
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recognized power structure, which is why men wish to maintain its 
single gender character.244 The VMI case was about more than educa-
tion.245 It was about wealth, power, and who will have those advantages 
in the future. 246 VMI was "a haven for a dominating and anti-female 
understanding of men and masculinity. "247 It also produced ~ negative 
culture of male-female relations. 248 It was part of a system of male 
privilege because it taught men to hate the feminine, and that a 
feminine leader will always be less than a masculine leader.249 The 
policies ofVMI have kept women out of positions of power by denying 
them access to the strong alumni network and have perpetuated the 
concept of women as being inferior to men.250 
Viewing the VMI case through an anti-subordination lens, VMI 
clearly would not pass the analysis. First, the plaintiff would have to 
show that VMI's policy or action had a disparate impact on members 
of the plaintiffs sex.251 This burden is easily met. The policy of exclud-
ing women from VMI had a disparate impact on women in both 
educational opportunities, because women who wished to experience 
a VMI-type of education could not, and in career opportunities, be-
cause women were denied access to the VMI alumni network for job 
opportunities.252 
Second, in order to pass muster the defendants would have to 
show that the policy of excluding women has an anti-subordination 
goa1.253 Since the conduct so clearly subordinates women, by denying 
244 See Keco, supra note 179, at 499; see also Epstein, supra note 121, at 117-18. 
245 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1120. 
246 See id. 
247Id. at 1127. 
24B See Shapiro, supra note 240, at B5. "Certain military academies may provide particularly 
florid examples, with exotic degradation ceremonies in which initiates are symbolically identified 
with women." Id. The link between misogyny and all-male groups is strong. See id. One commen-
tator described such a negative culture at the all-male academies: 
It is no accident that one form of verbal abuse heaped on cadets is to castigate them 
for being 'sissies,' 'pussies,' or 'fucking little girls.' Any perceived weakness along 
stereotyped lines of masculinity, including being 'too nice,' or caring, or showing 
emotion, are derided in feminine and homophobic terms. Further highlighting this 
anxious need to preserve a sharply hierarchical line between proper men and 
women, women who attempt to excel in traditionally male domains like VMI and 
The Citadel, are also frequently reviled in sexualized terms that call both their 
femininity and sexuality into question. 
Finley, supra note 1, at 1116. 
249 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1127. 
250 See Feldblum et aI., supra note 2, at 171; see also Epstein, supra note 121, at 117-18. 
251 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
252 See generally United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). 
253 See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text. 
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them educational and career opportunities, the state would have a 
hard time showing that its policy has an anti-subordination goal,254 The 
stereotypes of men and women perpetuated by VMI stigmatized mem-
bers of the subordinate group (women) to the advantage of the domi-
nant group (men).255 VMI's exclusion of women was for the benefit of 
men, a group that has not been subordinated in the past.256 Therefore, 
a publicly funded all-male VMI cannot be said to have an anti-subor-
dination goal. 257 
The state's remedial plan of the VWIL could be considered to have 
an anti-subordination goal, but would fail since it actually subordinated 
the women's interests to the male interests of keeping VMI all-male. 258 
VMI also subordinated women because even though VWIL is more 
humane and possibly preferable for everyone, Virginia would have 
never pulled the public resources out of VMI to build up the VWIL 
program and open it up to men as well. 259 If Virginia chose to empha-
size the VWIL, this would call into question the traditionally mascu-
line and make the traditionally feminine something valuable for both 
sexes.260 The state chose to preserve the masculine model for men only, 
perpetuating the perception that women, and anything "feminine," are 
not valuable. 261 
C. All-Women Colleges-Anti-subordination Analysis 
Women's colleges pass both traditional and anti-subordination 
inquiries because they do not have a disparate impact upon either men 
or women, and they have an anti-subordination goaP62 
254 See generally United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264. 
255 See Levitsky, supra note 204, at 1044. 
256 See id. 
257 See supra Part IV.A (The Theory). 
258 See generally United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2272-73, 2282-87. For further discussion 
ofVWIL, see supra notes 14, 53 and accompanying text. 
259 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1105. Experts testified that VWIL was a better program for 
preparing leaders and that many men would prefer it over VMI. See id. at 1116. There was also 
no testimony that the adversative method was better for men than women. See id.; see also Keco, 
supra note 179, at 499 ("[T]he creation of [a women's leadership institute] perpetuates the 
subordination of women by relegating to them the stereotypical options that the legislature deems 
appropriate.") . 
260 See Finley, supra note 1, at 1105-06. 
261 See id. at 1106. 
262 See Land, supra note 5, at 317-21 (for traditional test); infra notes 267-281 and accom-
panying text (for anti-subordination analysis of women's colleges). But see Epstein, supra note 
121, at 117-18 (stating women's colleges may fail an anti-subordination test). 
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Under the traditional doctrine, courts have accepted the argu-
ment that all-women colleges constitutionally serve a substantial state 
interest.263 "Those that seek to encourage and empower the tradition-
ally subordinate, to give them a safe space to flourish, may actually 
foster the anti-subordination principle. "264 Anti-subordination has been 
recognized as a state interest, since females should have the chance to 
study and develop leadership skills in a sexism-free environment.265 
However, anti-subordination as a rationale under intermediate scrutiny 
was rejected in Hogan because of a lack of empirical evidence and 
compelling state policies.266 
Under the anti-subordination analysis, there would have to be a 
showing of a disparate impact and subordination in order to declare 
all women's colleges admissions policies invalid.267 It is important to 
inquire about which gender benefits more from the current situation, 
and how these benefits might be spread out in a way that is better for 
society.268 'Women's colleges go to the heart of that issue because they 
exist to address inequality between the sexes and to serve the interests 
of women-not as places where women can think differently, or learn 
differently, or speak differently, but as the proverbial room of one's 
own."269 The important question would be: "Does the institution rein-
force traditional views of women or does it provide women with the 
skills and tools to fight their subordination?"270 
In applying the anti-subordination analysis to most of the women's 
colleges, which view themselves as training women to be leaders in our 
society or as creating a society in which their compensatory function 
is no longer necessary,271 the first question is if a policy of single-sex 
education for women has a disparate impact on the plaintiffs class.272 
If the plaintiff is male, there would have to be a disparate impact on 
men for the suit to be successful.273 This result is not likely, since there 
are other universities where a man could get access to a similar educa-
263 See Calker, supra note 199, at 1054; see also Land, supra note 5, at 317-18. 
264 Finley, supra note 1, at 1127. 
265 See Calker, supra note 199, at 1055. 
266 See id. at 1057. 
267 See id. at 1065-66. 
268 See Shapiro, supra note 240, at B5. 
269Id. But see Epstein, supra note 121, at 117-18 (stating that "[s]ex segregation in any social 
institution has overwhelmingly destructive consequences for women"). 
270 Calker, supra note 199, at 1066. 
271 See Rhode, supra note 88, at 144. 
272 See Calker, supra note 199, at 1014-15, 1033-34. 
273 See id. at 1014-15. 
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tion. Furthermore, when males are excluded from women's colleges, 
this exclusion does not create the same stigma or economic and social 
disadvantages as excluding women from all-male schools.274 
For example, our hypothetical male litigant is not likely to succeed 
under an anti-subordination theory. Even though he has a sincere 
interest in women's studies and history and would otherwise be an 
excellent candidate in terms of extracurricular (for example, if he 
played field hockey) and career interests, and even though he may not 
be able to find a comparable education because of his unique interests, 
he does not suffer from a social stigma by not being able to attend an 
all-female college. Furthermore, while he may be able to meet the first 
prong of the test, the disparate impact, he will not be able to prove 
subordination.275 Women's colleges are not a power structure that 
subordinates men, but a power structure that helps women achieve.276 
Compare the hypothetical male applicant with a woman who wishes to 
enter an all-male academy.277 She has a sincere interest in studying 
subjects in which the academy specializes, she would be willing and 
able to participate in extracurricular activities, and attending the acad-
emy would suit her career goals. She is able to prove both disparate 
impact and subordination, since all-male academies are based on re-
serving the power in society for men.278 
Even if some sort of disparate impact was proven, the women's 
colleges could justify it by showing that excluding men is for an anti-
subordination purpose, which is clearly shown in the studies done on 
women's colleges.279 If the plaintiff was female, the disparate impact 
could only exist if the institution was harming women in some way. 280 
As the literature shows, women's colleges help women achieve equality 
and do not further societal constraints on them.281 
274 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 216-17. 
275 See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (for anti-subordination analysis). 
276 See supra Part IIIA.2.b-c Uustifications and Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
277 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993). See generally United States v. 
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). 
278 See Keco, supra note 179, at 498--99. See generally Cooper-Boggs, supra note 63, at 131-36. 
279 See supra Part 1IIA.2.c (Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges). 
280 See supra Part IIIA.2.c (Evidentiary Support for Women's Colleges); if. Epstein, supra 
note 121, at 117-18 (stating that all-women colleges have "destructive consequences for women" 
by reinforcing "disadvantages women face when they attempt to gain access to the opportunities 
and networks of association that are available to men"); Rhode, supra note 88, at 144 ("In 
all-female settings, it is more difficult to challenge the underlying cultural attitudes that perpetu-
ate subordination; by definition, many of those most in need of such challenge are absent."). 
281 See Feldblum et al., supra note 2, at 218. "But as the remedial role of all-female schools 
becomes less necessary, their status becomes more problematic." Rhode, supra note 88, at 144. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
While equality is an aspiration in our society, the realities of society 
show that women have not reached that goal. True equality is not 
always possible when there has been a history of discrimination, since 
equal treatment may perpetuate the discrimination already in exist-
ence. While some see the integration of VMI as the beginning of the 
end for women's colleges, the truth is that excluding men from all-
women colleges is quite different than keeping women out of all-men 
colleges. The United States v. Virginia opinion, while avoiding the issue 
of women's colleges, included language that recognized anti-subordi-
nation as a legitimate state interest. If the Supreme Court was to 
recognize anti-subordination as a legitimate goal, sex-differentiating 
policies would not be deemed unconstitutional merely because they 
were sex-differentiating. The conduct would need to have a subordi-
nating disparate impact.282 A "policy could be justified only if it was 
established to overcome subordination. "283 While anti-subordination 
theory is not in the mainstream, and there is a lack of explicit refer-
ence to this approach in cases, it is merely an extention of the idea 
that sometimes asymmetry is necessary to effectuate equality-an idea 
which courts have accepted. The experience and outcomes between 
women's colleges and all-male academies are dramatically different, 
and despite comparisons between the two, women's colleges should 
not be threatened by the Supreme Court's decision in VMI. 
282 See Calker, supra note 199, at 1061. 
283ld. 

